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BILLS TO PAY AND MOUTHS TO FEED: FORFEITURE AND DUE 
PROCESS CONCERNS AFTER ALVAREZ V. SMITH 
INTRODUCTION 
Chermane Smith could be anyone.  She could be a single mother working 
two jobs to make ends meet.  She could be a volunteer at a nursing home on 
Tuesday nights and a deacon in her church on Sunday mornings.  Chermane 
Smith could be anyone, and anyone could be Chermane Smith.1  Anyone could 
trust their boyfriend or brother with their car for an afternoon. Anyone could 
have a fiancé or an aunt who needed a fix so badly that they had to find a ride.  
But mostly, anyone could wait restlessly into the night, pacing by the phone, 
only to get a midnight call: Your boyfriend is under arrest.  We found him with 
a trunk full of drugs.  We’re going to have to hold on to your car for a while.  
Anyone could get that call.  Chermane Smith could be anyone. 
In Alvarez v. Smith, Chermane Smith and five other respondents 
challenged the seizure of their property by the Chicago Police Department and 
its officers without, they claimed on appeal, a grant of sufficient due process.2  
Chicago police, pursuant to Illinois’s Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act 
(DAFPA), seized Smith’s car based on its connection with alleged drug 
activity and forced her to wait over a year for a hearing regarding its return.3  
Following an adverse ruling by the district court, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the police had violated the procedural due process 
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the respondents 
were entitled to specific post-seizure hearings to determine whether their 
property should be released or subjected to forfeiture under DAFPA.4  State’s 
Attorney Anita Alvarez appealed that decision, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.5  After a contentious oral argument, the Court found the case to be 
 
 1. David G. Savage, Deciding “What the Law Is”, AMERICA.GOV (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2009/October/20091015150918wrybakcuh0.1189081 
.html (describing the circumstances of the seizure of Chermane Smith’s vehicle). 
 2. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 579 (2009). 
 3. Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–9 (2004) 
(Supp. 2005).  In addition to Smith’s property, the police seized the vehicles of respondents 
Edmanuel Perez and Tyhesha Brunston and cash held by respondents Michelle Waldo, Kirk 
Yunker, and Tony Williams.  Respondents’ Brief at 1, 3 Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576 (2009) 
(No. 08-351). 
 4. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 5. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 576. 
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moot and dismissed the State of Illinois’s appeal—but also unexpectedly 
vacated the opinion of the Seventh Circuit.6 
Alvarez v. Smith was properly held moot for failing to present the Court 
with an active case or controversy, but it will likely lead to procedural 
dilemmas for future forfeiture claims.7 Due to the interplay between time limits 
in forfeiture statutes and mootness doctrine, the Court’s unexpected vacatur of 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, and the procedural limitations on forfeiture 
claims, the Court’s holding in Alvarez v. Smith is likely to complicate future 
forfeiture jurisprudence. 
To properly address these complications, this Note will explore the 
relationship of forfeiture to due process.  Part I will explore the history of civil 
forfeiture, which allows law enforcement officials at every governmental level 
to seize property associated with illegal activity under color of law, without 
resorting to the processes and burdens of the criminal courts.8  Part II will trace 
the historical path that led the Court to grant certiorari in Alvarez, so as to 
better answer the question of whether the Court’s determination was justified.  
While the Court stated that its holding would ease future litigation of forfeiture 
disputes,9 Part III will detail the complications that have blossomed from the 
Court’s holding.  Finally, Part IV will examine whether the hearing framework 
presented in Smith v. City of Chicago10 should have been upheld and then 
discuss whether it would have advanced due process as applied to forfeiture.  
Only by working through these issues can the questions that remain after 
Alvarez v. Smith be properly resolved. 
I.  FORFEITURE: FROM INCEPTION TO EXPANSION 
To understand why Alvarez resulted in such a procedural morass, it is 
necessary to first have an understanding of the development and current use of 
forfeiture in criminal circumstances. 
 
 6. Id. at 578.  The real surprise in the opinion was not the mootness result but the vacatur of 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.  See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 7. Both relitigation and future litigation of similar claims will be affected by the Court’s 
decision due to the loss of the hearing requirement and the emphasis placed on class certification 
in similar claims.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 8. While forfeiture has been used extensively by law enforcement agencies to supplement 
their funding, it also presents opportunities for violations of the due process rights of those from 
whom property is taken.  See Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 
Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 779, 782 (2009) (detailing the expanded use and resultant dangers of 
civil forfeiture actions taken by law enforcement agencies). 
 9. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583. 
 10. 524 F.3d 834. 
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A. The Development of Forfeiture in America 
In the United States, civil forfeiture commonly takes place concurrent 
with—rather than separate from—state or federal criminal prosecution.11  As a 
result of this setup, forfeiture actions can both punish crimes12 and—through 
the use of their proceeds—alleviate societal damages associated with criminal 
activity.13 
Although early references to forfeiture were made in biblical texts,14 the 
doctrine did not reach its current form until it was developed under the 
common law.15  In common law England, proceeds from the sale of property 
associated with crimes were forfeited to the sovereign as “deodands,” which 
acted as a tool of compensation for the costs resulting from the carelessness of 
subjects.16  American forfeiture law developed from these common law 
beginnings, and continued not only the practice of forfeiting property to the 
government but also the tradition of identifying the property itself as the 
defendant in any claim.17 
While forfeiture has existed in this country since its inception, forfeiture 
was not exercised extensively until the passage of the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.18  That law, which widened the 
acceptable circumstances for forfeiture, led to an unprecedented expansion of 
 
 11. Cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); Lobzun v. United States, 422 F.3d 503 
(7th Cir. 2005). 
 12. See Melissa A. Rolland, Comment, Forfeiture Law, the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause, and United States v. Bajakajian, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1999) 
(“[F]orfeiture law became a major tool in the war on crime and drugs.”). 
 13. Cf. Moores, supra note 8, at 780–81 (“[O]bject[s] or animal[s] involved in a wrong 
against a human . . . . were given to the lord or king ‘in the belief that the [k]ing would . . . insure 
that the [forfeited item] was put to [good] charitable uses.’”) (fourth alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 
(1974)). 
 14. David Benjamin Ross, Comment, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction That Offends Due Process, 
13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.17 (quoting 
Exodus 21:28)). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; Moores, supra note 8 at 780–81.  For further discussion of deodands, see Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16 (“Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, to be given to 
God.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 17. Moores, supra note 8, at 781 (describing the adaptation of in rem proceedings to U.S. 
admiralty cases).  For more recent examples, see United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 
U.S. 555 (1983); In re Various Items of Pers. Prop., 282 U.S. 577 (1931); United States v. 
$191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2006)). 
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property seizure by law enforcement officials.19  However, after public 
backlash began to grow over the excessive and improper use of forfeiture,20 
Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act in 2000 to provide 
more specific guidance as to when and under what circumstances forfeiture 
actions would be appropriate.21 
Forfeiture actions originated at the federal level, however, numerous states 
have adopted statutes allowing state agencies to engage in forfeiture actions 
similar to those pioneered by the federal government.22  Such legislation often 
serves to unify state and federal forfeiture practices and thereby ensures that 
state seizures will fulfill all federal requirements.23 
This unification has led to a set of general standards as to when and under 
what circumstances forfeiture is appropriate: 
Three elements must be present in order to subject a claimant’s property to 
civil forfeiture . . . : (1) the subject property must be moneys, negotiable 
instruments, securities, or other things of value; (2) there must be probable 
cause to believe that there exists illicit drug activity that renders the seized 
property subject to forfeiture; and (3) there must be probable cause to believe 
that a connection, or nexus, exists between the seized property and the 
predicate activity the government has identified.24 
In the United States, much as in common law England, forfeiture 
encourages property owners to carefully manage their property by setting forth 
applicable consequences should that property be used for illicit purposes.25  
This history and purpose not only establish forfeiture as a unique process, but 
 
 19. Cf. Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 46 (2008) (describing an “explosion of cases” related to federal 
and state forfeiture laws implemented in the 1970s). 
 20. See Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why The Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 81, 81–84 (2000) (detailing abuses of forfeiture power leading up to the passage of 
the Act in 2000). 
 21. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–984) (2006) (expanding forfeiture actions to include additional property 
types while establishing a set framework for forfeiture proceedings). 
 22. See, e.g., Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1–9 
(2004) (Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703 (West 2001) (Supp. 2009). 
 23. Compare Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at 
150/4(1), with Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 24. United States v. $10,700 in U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing inter 
alia 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)).  Although this provision deals with actions related to drug crimes, 
restrictions on all forfeiture actions were contained in Section 2 of the Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act.  Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006). 
 25. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 41 (1995) (detailing the use of forfeiture as a 
punishment). 
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also provide government agencies with justification for taking advantage of  
forfeiture’s substantial financial benefits. 
B. Taking Back From Thieves: The Benefits of Effective Forfeiture 
When properly performed, forfeiture fulfills the dual purposes of denying 
assets critical to criminal operations and providing law enforcement agencies 
with financial assistance.26 
Soon after forfeiture was approved as a tool of law enforcement, federal 
agencies began seizing assets associated with criminal activity that were 
discovered in the course of investigations.27  This practice became a 
phenomenal success, with the prime example being the DEA’s ability to 
finance almost the entirety of its 1987 budget through funds obtained via 
seizure.28  Not wanting to be left out, state governments quickly implemented 
programs allowing state and local authorities to engage in similar forfeiture 
actions.29  With these additions, forfeiture rapidly expanded at both the state 
and federal levels  to reach an impressive a financial scope.  This could be seen 
in 2008, when the Department of Justice took possession of over $443 million 
in assets seized through just five civil forfeiture actions.30 
In addition to its monetary benefits, authorities praise forfeiture for its 
effectiveness in disrupting the functional abilities of large-scale illegal 
operations.31  While the confiscation of small amounts of narcotics may 
destroy the business of one drug dealer, proponents argue that forfeiture can 
even more efficiently assist in the war on drugs by enabling law enforcement 
to seize large amounts of cash, thereby crippling major trafficking operations.32 
Based on forfeiture’s financial and punitive effectiveness, it is no wonder 
that it is so commonly used by law enforcement agencies.  It must be 
recognized, however, that while forfeiture can provide agencies with immense 
benefits when used properly, its self-serving nature also presents the 
temptation for misuse.33 
 
 26. J. Mitchell Miller & Lance H. Selva, Drug Enforcement’s Double-Edged Sword: An 
Assessment of Asset Forfeiture Programs, 11 JUST. Q. 313, 314–15 (1994). 
 27. Id. at 316–17. 
 28. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in 
Drug Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 4, 6. 
 29. Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317 (“By 1985, 47 states had passed [forfeiture] 
legislation.”). 
 30. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REP. 09-19, ASSETS 
FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT FISCAL 
YEAR 2008, at 6 (2009). 
 31. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 318. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 5. 
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C. Becoming Thieves Themselves: The Dangers of Excessive Forfeiture 
While forfeiture benefits society by financially supporting the efforts of 
law enforcement agencies, it also presents constitutional risks that cannot be 
ignored.34  Individuals subjected to forfeiture face a direct threat to their 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process if they are not given an 
opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of a seizure.35  When property is seized 
and owners are denied a meaningful opportunity to explain their 
circumstances, the underlying deprivation imposes an unjustified burden on the 
individual subjected to forfeiture.36 
In addition to these procedural dangers, forfeiture can adversely influence 
the motivations of law enforcement officials.  While forfeiture’s greatest 
advantage may be the financial windfall that law enforcement agencies reap 
from seizing assets associated with criminal activity, excessive dependence on 
forfeited funds can lead to questionable seizures of property unrelated to the 
crime committed or devoid of procedural protections.37  In this way, forfeiture 
can create a perverse incentive for law enforcement officials to target certain 
criminal activity specifically because of its forfeiture implications.38  
Departments that rely excessively on funds obtained from such activities may 
be sapped with internal corruption and may be more prone to perform illicit 
searches, arrests, and seizures with the aim towards financial gain.39  Forfeiture 
presents a “double-edged sword” to departments: It provides great financial 
benefits but also tempts them to obtain those benefits illicitly.40 
While civil forfeiture can be a valuable and effective tool for fighting 
crime, the dangers it presents to both due process and the priorities of law 
enforcement agencies require that caution temper any praise given. 
 
 34. There are some constitutional rights that are not implicated by forfeiture.  Civil forfeiture 
actions do not constitute violations of an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to avoid double 
jeopardy.  United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274 (1996).  Nor does forfeiture implicate the 
Fourth Amendment right to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures.  See Florida v. White, 526 
U.S. 559, 563–64 (1999). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 315 (citing 
journalistic accounts of civil liberties violations resulting from enforced asset forfeiture). 
 36. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (detailing how a violation of 
due process can be associated with improper seizure and biased seizure procedures). 
 37. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 7. 
 38. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons 
From Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 89 (1996).  While this is most often 
seen in improperly motivated seizures, it can also be seen in where the police do not seize 
property.  Cf. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 8 (describing the police practice of targeting 
budget-padding cash for seizure, rather than drugs that would be destroyed). 
 39. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 28, at 5. 
 40. Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 313, 328–31. 
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II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS 
AND FORFEITURE 
Forfeiture implicates a number of Constitutional freedoms—most notably 
the right to due process of the law.41  The following section details the 
progression of due process rights within forfeiture matters, and pays particular 
attention to a recent case that allows those rights to leap forward. 
A. Early Developments in Due Process and Forfeiture 
There has been considerable controversy over what procedures are needed 
to guarantee due process during forfeiture actions, primarily on the questions 
of whether hearings are required before property is taken and how extensive 
those hearings might need to be. 
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process 
required that an evidentiary hearing be held before recipients of state or federal 
welfare programs were forced to forfeit benefits.42  Justice Brennan wrote that 
it was irrelevant that benefits were a “privilege and not a right;”43 so long as an 
interest that resembled property was seized by the government, relevant 
constitutional constraints applied.44  Justice Brennan realized that not all 
property rights would be protected,45 but he held that so long as an individual’s 
“interest in avoiding that loss outweigh[ed] the government’s interest in 
summary adjudication,” due process required additional proceedings.46 
Later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court broke from the bare-bones 
procedure in Goldberg and set forth a more developed framework for 
determining what proceedings were necessary to protect due process in 
forfeiture actions.47  Specifically, Justice Powell held that three factors had to 
be considered when determining whether a hearing was required under due 
process: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
 
 41. See Ross, supra note 14, at 263–64 (noting courts have avoided the requirements of due 
process to justify seizure). 
 42. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
 43. Id. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 44. Id. at 262 & n.8 (referring to the property interest present in social security benefits). 
 45. Id. at 263 (referring to non-welfare government benefits). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1150 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1143 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.48 
Through this framework, Mathews gave rise to an expanded set of 
circumstances where probable cause hearings would be necessary to protect 
due process rights.49 
Mathews’s elasticity becomes apparent in cases such as United States v. 
Farmer, where the plaintiff requested a probable cause hearing after officers 
confiscated a large amount of cash during a drug-related arrest.50  Since the 
government was unable to show that this act would be unduly burdensome, the 
court ordered a hearing to determine if the seizure was proper.51  Through the 
holding in Farmer, the court was able to demonstrate that the Mathews 
standard was flexible enough to apply to due process controversies stemming 
from disparate factual circumstances.52  This flexibility, though, did not 
prevent the court from breaking away from Mathews under certain 
circumstances. 
In $8,850 in U.S. Currency and Von Neumann, the Court diverged from 
Mathews by determining the need for hearings in accordance with speedy trial 
standards.53  In those cases, the Court found that since due process would be 
primarily infringed upon by the delay between seizure and forfeiture 
proceedings, the speedy-trial test advanced in Barker v. Wingo should be 
invoked in order to balance the interests of both the prosecution and the 
defendant.54  In weighing those interests, the Court in Barker based its analysis 
on four factors: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the 
defendant’s assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant.”55  
While the Court in Barker adjudged the necessity of hearings to support due 
process by balancing factors, it diverged from the frameworks set forth in 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process, and Protective 
Proceedings: Are Our Probate Codes Unconstitutional?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 57, 66–67 
(1999) (describing Mathews’s expansion of Goldberg’s factors).  Ironically, in Mathews itself, the 
Court applied these factors and determined that additional proceedings were not required due to 
the elaborate administrative benefits already in place.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. 
 50. United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001).  Specifically, the plaintiff 
requested a hearing as to whether all of his funds should have been subject to seizure, as he could 
not afford representation without at least a portion of the seized proceeds.  Id. at 804. 
 51. Id. at 805. 
 52. For a similarly flexible application of the Mathews standard to real property, see United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–55 (1993). 
 53. United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); United States v. $8,850 in 
U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983). 
 54. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 251; $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 564. 
 55. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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Mathews and Farmer by placing higher weight on the timing of the hearings 
themselves.56 
Similarly, in Dusenberry, the Court further separated itself from a 
complete reliance on the hearing provisions in Mathews by stating that it 
“never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due 
process claims.”57  The Court recognized that parties whose property had been 
seized were entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard,”58 but it adopted 
a more straightforward test that allowed for the fulfillment of due process, so 
long as notice was reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to inform 
the party of the pending forfeiture.59  This test gave the government a 
significantly lower burden of proof in order to deny additional hearings and 
seemed to lower the standard needed for fulfillment of due process.60 
The difference between the due process standards in Barker and 
Dusenberry and the standard utilized in Mathews presented a conflict in need 
of an interpretive ruling.  But, just like divergences in any other area of law, 
conflicts in due process and forfeiture can only be resolved by a case 
crystallizing the problem.  For these topics, it seemed that Smith v. City of 
Chicago could have been that case.61 
B. Smith v. City of Chicago—A Turning Point 
Smith was a combination of six separate claims of allegedly improper 
forfeiture.62  Each of the plaintiffs’ property had been seized by Chicago police 
officers pursuant to DAFPA, which enabled law enforcement officials to 
subject drug-related property to forfeiture proceedings that would provide state 
agencies with a direct benefit.63  After seizure, the plaintiffs were denied 
hearings related to their seized property and were forced to wait for more than 
a year to contest its forfeiture.64 
 
 56. See id. 
 57. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002). 
 58. Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 
(1993). 
 59. Id. at 167, 169. 
 60. See id. at 168–73 (finding that sending a letter by certified mail to the prison where the 
defendant was housed was reasonably calculated under the circumstances to inform the party of 
the forfeiture). 
 61. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3.  Three of the plaintiffs had their automobiles 
seized by the police without being charged with an offense.  Id.  The other three had cash seized.  
Id. 
 63. Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/505(g) (2004) (allocating proceeds from 
forfeitures: 65% to the law enforcement agency involved in the seizure; 25% to the prosecuting 
attorney’s office, and 10% surrendered as court costs). 
 64. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
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The plaintiffs argued that DAFPA’s timetable for resolving forfeiture 
disputes65 violated due process by effectively preventing them from setting 
forth the innocent-owner defense permitted under Illinois law.66  All six 
plaintiffs filed for injunctive relief to prevent the State from applying DAFPA, 
claiming that due process required an opportunity for prompt, post-seizure 
hearings to determine the propriety of forfeiture action.67 
The district court was not convinced that this relief was necessary and 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims based on a prior contrary Seventh Circuit 
holding.68  The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court’s 
dismissal,69 noting that while it had previously refused to hear challenges to 
forfeiture policy, it had only done so because due process was generally 
satisfied when proceedings were instituted within a reasonable period after 
seizure.70  The court expressed serious doubts that its own precedent was still 
controlling and used the Mathews framework to readdress the due process 
question.71  After looking to previous opinions that applied Mathews to 
seizures involving automobiles, the court concluded that prompt post-seizure 
retention hearings, with adequate notice, were necessary for these seizures to 
satisfy due process.72 
Due to the number of salient factors present in the seizure of an 
automobile, the court held that probable cause needed to be shown before full 
forfeiture could take place.73  The hardship posed by the loss of transportation, 
 
 65. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/5–6 (2004) (Supp. 2005).  Following seizure, a state agency 
will have fifty-two days to decide whether to recommend that the prosecutor file a forfeiture 
action.  Id. at 150/5.  The prosecutor then has an additional forty-five days to review the forfeiture 
recommendation. Id. at 150/6.  Only after the prosecutor decides to file for forfeiture is notice 
sent to the owner, who then has forty-five days to file a verified claim and post a cost bond.  Id. at 
150/6(C)(1).  Bond is set at 10% of the value assigned to the property by Petitioner or $100, 
whichever is greater.  Id. at 150/6(C)(2).  Posting bond does not result in release of the seized 
property and functions, in effect, as a filing fee.  Id.  Following the issuance of a claim or bond, 
another forty-five days can pass before the hearing, allowing for 187 days total to pass between a 
seizure and any hearing on its propriety.  Id. 
 66. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3–4; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at 150/8(A) 
(setting forth Illinois’s innocent-owner defense). 
 67. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 3, at 4; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. at 150/9 
(requiring an ultimate forfeiture proceeding). 
 68. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 835 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that in the 
district court, plaintiffs conceded that their complaint should be dismissed); see also Jones v. 
Takaki, 38 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claims for injunctive relief under DAFPA). 
 69. Smith, 524 F.3d at 839. 
 70. Id. at 836 (citing Jones, 38 F.3d at 324). 
 71. Id. at 836–38 (rejecting the application of the standard utilized in Jones in favor of that 
found in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 72. Id. at 837. 
 73. Id. at 837–38.  The court cited a number of salient factors in assessing the private 
interests, including the possibility that there may be an innocent owner of the seized automobile, 
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the court held, required an opportunity for the owner to be heard.74  This was 
particularly true when the driver of the vehicle, rather than its owner, was the 
individual engaged in the activity that justified the seizure.75 
The court expressed its sympathy that such a hearing would impose an 
administrative burden on the city, but it noted that a governing entity is always 
burdened by due process.76  The required hearing was not meant to be a 
protracted proceeding but merely an opportunity for authorities to notify the 
property owner of the seizure and provide them an opportunity to show why 
the property should be released.77 
Smith represented a turning point in forfeiture jurisprudence by requiring 
post-seizure hearings in order to uphold due process.  This requirement was a 
departure from Seventh Circuit precedent, and it represented a shift in the way 
that forfeiture actions would be applied.78  To prevent such a result from 
occurring, the State promptly filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.79  Those hoping that the law of due process and forfeiture could be 
modified, however, would soon be disappointed. 
III.  ALVAREZ V. SMITH: THE COURT’S OPINION 
While the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. City of Chicago addressed 
the merits of the dispute by focusing on the due process implications of 
forfeiture under DAFPA, the Supreme Court made no such sweeping 
determinations on appeal.  From the first moments of oral argument to the end 
of the majority opinion, the Court approached the controversy in a markedly 
different manner from that adopted by the Seventh Circuit.80  In an opinion by 
Justice Breyer, the Court ultimately held that the injunctive claims of Smith 
 
the importance of an automobile as a mode of transportation, the availability of hardship relief, 
and the length of the deprivation.  Id. at 837. 
 74. Smith, 524 F.3d at 838. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Smith had the potential to affect not only the DAFPA but also all forfeiture actions 
adjudicated by the Seventh Circuit.  Cf. id. at 839 (stating that the Seventh Circuit circulated the 
Smith opinion to all judges of the court). 
 79. The petition was originally filed under the name of then State’s Attorney Richard A. 
Devine who had been a named defendant in the initial action.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Devine v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576 (2009) (No. 08-351). 
 80. The Court’s choice to avoid the (comparatively exciting) due process issues addressed 
by the Seventh Circuit did not go unnoticed.  See Nathan Koppel, The Supreme Court Shows Off 
Its Dull Side, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009, 8:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/ 
15/the-supreme-court-shows-off-its-dull-side (commenting that the justices seemed more focused 
on removing the case procedurally than deciding its substantive issues). 
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and the other respondents were moot and that the ruling (and hearing 
requirement) Judge Evans set forth for the Seventh Circuit should be vacated.81 
Although the Court in Alvarez v. Smith initially granted certiorari to review 
the merits of the case, admissions by both counsels during oral argument that 
the underlying property claims of the respondents had been completed all but 
assured that the Court would ultimately declare the case moot.82  Since the 
respondents could no longer present valid claims for relief on the merits, the 
Court held that an active “case or controversy” as required for standing under 
Article III was not present.83  The Court further noted that since the 
respondents’ attempt to file a class action had not been certified by the district 
court,84 and since their actions for relief in the form of damages had not been 
attached to the injunctive claim at issue,85 no controversy existed before it that 
would sufficiently justify a ruling.86  Instead, the Court felt that by declaring 
the matter moot and leaving the damages issue open, a path would be cleared 
for relitigation.87 
Although the Court can issue a ruling on the merits of a case in certain 
exceptional situations where an active controversy may not be present, the 
Court refused to review this claim under such an exception.88  Specifically, the 
Court refused to hear this case as a matter “capable of repetition while evading 
review.”89  The Court noted that the parties presented no evidence that the 
individual claimants would be subject to subsequent victimization of seizure 
procedures and that the matter was, therefore, not capable of repetition.90  
Further, the Court held that the possibility of respondents litigating damages 
claims prevented the action from evading review.91 
While the Court was unanimous in reaching its mootness holding, 
contention arose as to the proper treatment of the ruling below.92  The majority 
held that since each of the listed claims had been resolved through their natural 
 
 81. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 578 (2009), vacating as moot Smith v. City of 
Chicago, 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 57, Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. 576 (No. 08-351). 
 83. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580 (applying provisions of Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 580. 
 86. Id. at 581. 
 87. Id. at 581, 583. 
 88. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581. 
 89. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 581 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978)). 
 92. See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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course, the decision of the lower court should be vacated.93  Justice Stevens, 
dissenting in part, disagreed by noting that since at least one of the 
respondents’ claims was resolved by discretionary settlement,94 the holding in 
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership required that the 
Court leave the Seventh Circuit’s opinion intact.95  The majority disagreed, 
holding that the settlement on which Justice Stevens keyed was little more than 
a “happenstance” occurrence through the natural progression of the seizure 
process—an occurrence that would not prejudice the ability of the parties to re-
file their claims.96  In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith was 
vacated, the requirement that those subjected to forfeiture receive prompt post-
seizure hearings was nullified, and the merits of the case were ignored.97  By 
holding the matter moot, the Court attempted to make it so that the 
respondents’ claims had never been filed.  The ultimate effects of their 
decision, though, would be considerably more complicated. 
IV.  COMPLICATIONS WITH MOOTNESS AND RELITIGATION: ALVAREZ’S 
DOUBLE-EDGED HOLDING 
Although the holding in Alvarez was intended to allow relitigation, it may 
inadvertently have led to complications for future litigants of forfeiture claims.  
To properly understand the implications of such a double-edged holding, 
multiple issues affected by Alvarez must be addressed.  First, this part will 
explain why it was proper for the claims in Alvarez to be held moot.  Second, 
 
 93. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (majority opinion).  The Court noted that it could “direct the 
entry of any such appropriate judgment” that “may be just under the circumstances.”  Id. at 581 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006)).  As such, it could vacate the judgment of the lower court on a 
moot matter in order to clear the path for future litigation, provided that equity and fairness 
considerations did not tilt against such a ruling.  Id. at 581, 583.  If the lower court decision had 
become moot by way of settlement, vacating the lower court’s decision could unfairly constrain 
equity and fairness by eliminating the very purpose for which a party had voluntarily forfeited his 
right to appeal.  Id. at 582 (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 
24–26 (1994).  The Court found that since the six cases making up the action before it had been 
remedied without any solid “procedural link” to the current dispute, they were mooted through 
“happenstance” rather than through settlement and, thus, did not prevent vacatur of the judgment 
below.  Id.; see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950) (describing 
the manner in which lower decisions may be vacated). 
 94. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  The claim of respondent 
Michelle Waldo for $1,500 seized under DAFPA was resolved through a “compromise 
settlement” that resulted in the return of her cash after the evidence had been weighed.  Id. at 582 
(majority opinion). 
 95. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  Justice Stevens suggests that a more 
prudential action, if the Court had mootness concerns, may have been to dismiss the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted, which would have allowed the opinion of the Seventh Circuit 
to remain standing.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 581–82 (majority opinion). 
 97. Id. at 583. 
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this part will address the propriety of the Court’s decision to vacate the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion.  Finally, this part will detail complications resulting 
from the vacatur so that the implications of Alvarez can come into full focus. 
A. The Claim was Properly Held Moot 
Alvarez is a case filled with constitutional concerns that failed to present an 
effective ruling on the controversial questions of law presented.98  After 
looking at the absence of an active case or controversy and the difficulties 
presented by trying to apply an exception though, it is clear that the Court 
acted properly in holding respondents’ claims moot. 
1. There was No Active Case or Controversy Present 
Under Article III of the Constitution, the Court is only allowed to issue 
rulings on actual “Cases” or “Controversies” that are actively contested at all 
stages of appellate review.99  If the issue at stake is no longer active when it is 
presented to the Court, the parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome of 
the matter and the case should be dismissed as moot.100 
Since the respondents in Alvarez lacked class certification,101 the Court 
could consider only the claims of the six individuals joined to the matter.102  
During oral argument, though, the Court confirmed that the individual claims 
had already been resolved.103  After the resolution of these claims, including 
the return of Chermane Smith’s car, there was no active controversy pending 
before the Court; thus, any claim for an injunction would amount to nothing 
more than an “abstract dispute about the law.”104 
While the respondents argued that they had a claim of damages pending in 
district court at the time of oral argument,105 that claim would also be unlikely 
to provide the Respondents with any assistance in presenting a valid case or 
controversy.  Since each of the Respondents had their property seized by law 
enforcement officials acting under DAFPA, any claims for damages against 
those officials would be subject to a defense of qualified immunity.106  It is 
 
 98. See Koppel, supra note 80. 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974)) (finding that controversies that are active at 
the time the complaint is filed will not necessarily have standing throughout the litigation). 
 100. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (describing when the mootness 
doctrine is properly used). 
 101. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580. 
 102. Id. at 580. 
 103. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 5. 
 104. See id.; see also Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580. 
 105. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580. 
 106. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)) (“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
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likely that even if the property had been seized in a manner that violated due 
process, damages would not be available unless said seizure constituted a 
clearly established violation of a constitutional right.107  Since seizures under 
DAFPA are well supported by current law and since no hearing requirement 
existed for officers to violate through continued possession,108 it is highly 
unlikely that a damages claim would be successful unless a separate clearly 
established violation occurred.109  Based on the absence of a judiciable claim, 
the Court did not err in failing to find an active case or controversy. 
2. The Claim Was Not Admissible Under a Mootness Exception 
While a mootness holding usually prevents the Court from hearing the 
merits of a case, this result can be sidestepped in certain situations where a 
court otherwise might never be able to rule on a particular legal issue.  Cases 
that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” can be heard on appeal 
under an exception to the mootness doctrine despite the absence of a current 
controversy by the time they reach the appellate level.110 
Here, the claim presented by the respondents is not repeatable to the extent 
that the individual actors are not likely to stand before a court at a later time 
and argue the same issue.111  Although it is feasible that one of the 
respondent’s property could again be subjected to forfeiture—particularly if 
 
granted a qualified immunity and are ‘shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.’”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (“[Q]ualified immunity is ‘an immunity 
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . .’”). 
 107. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.  Although an action against the municipality (City of Chicago) 
would be permitted, the city would likely elect to settle any claim for damages to ensure that an 
active controversy would not present the Court with an opportunity to limit available occasions 
for forfeiture.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 108. At the time of the seizure of Respondents’ property, the hearing requirement set forth by 
the 7th Circuit was not yet in place.  Cf. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 835 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 109. This lack of available action for damages also paradoxically supports the admission of 
the claim under a mootness exception.  See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 37–
40 (1950) (finding that a holding of mootness should not prevent a claim for damages).  In 
Munsingwear, however, qualified immunity was not considered as a limiting factor, as the 
underlying action for control of commodities did not implicate 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See id. 
 110. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 463–64 
(2007) (ruling on constitutionality of campaign ads due to brevity of election cycle); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (ruling on constitutionality of abortion statute due to length of 
human gestation period); Sloan v. Dep’t of Transp., 666 S.E.2d 236, 240 (S.C. 2008) (ruling on 
constitutionality of emergency procurement of tax funds to road project due to limited time period 
of emergency). 
 111. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 581 (2009) (“[N]othing suggests that the individual 
plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State’s seizure procedures.”). 
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Smith and her compatriots continue to allow their vehicles to transport 
individuals involved in the drug trade—it is highly unlikely that such 
interactions with law enforcement would happen often enough to trigger the 
exception.112  The seizure and forfeiture of property is not analogous to the 
natural occurrence of pregnancy or the passage of an election cycle—it is not 
something that is destined to occur again.113  As such, it cannot be said that 
Respondents’ claim was sufficiently “capable of repetition.” 
The respondents have a better argument that their circumstances are 
capable of evading review.  Although the time constraints on individual 
forfeiture actions push them towards mootness,114 the majority in Alvarez 
brushed aside the notion that the cause could evade review by pointing to the 
respondents’ pending damages claim.115  However, as discussed above, it is 
possible that such a claim for damages could be blocked by qualified 
immunity.116  If the respondents (who were denied the class certification 
necessary to deliver a proper injunctive claim before the Court) were also 
unable to present a claim for damages, it is possible that their action may have 
evaded review in a manner that would trigger the exception.117  Since the 
claimants here had a pending action below that would likely have been 
applicable against the municipality, since not every future claimant will evade 
class certification, and since the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
 
 112. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (“[An individual] would 
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make 
the incredible assertion . . . that all police officers . . . always [violate the rights of] any citizen 
with whom they happen to have an encounter.”). 
 113. Compare Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–06, with Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (pregnancy), and Wis. 
Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463–64 (election cycle). 
 114. See cases cited supra note 110.  If, as in Roe, a nine-month human gestation period will 
not allow enough time for an action to reach the Court, it follows that a forfeiture with a lifespan 
of 187 days is not likely to succeed either. 
 115. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581 (“[I]n any event, since those who are directly affected by the 
forfeiture practices might bring damages actions, the practices do not ‘evade review.’”). 
 116. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  For this to occur, though, outside forces 
(such as statutory excusal) would need to be present that would excuse the City of Chicago from 
liability as well, as it has been well established that municipalities cannot adopt sovereign 
immunity for themselves.  Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649–50 (1980).  The 
rarity of such an occurrence further supports the notion that the exception should not apply. 
 117. This fact cannot be the focus of an appeal by the present respondents as the Court’s 
opinion is final and cannot be overturned.   It could, however, be used by future litigants to fight a 
denial of class certification that would effectively function as a dismissal of a claim for injunctive 
relief.  See discussion infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
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standard suggests that both elements must be present for the rule to apply,118 it 
seems that the exception was properly refused in this instance.119 
Since the respondents were not certified as a class, had no existing 
damages claim, and could not present a live claim for injunctive relief, they 
were not able to present an active case or controversy before the Court.  As the 
respondents’ claim failed to fulfill the “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” exception, the Court acted properly by holding the matter moot.120  
While this holding was sufficient and without controversy, the same cannot be 
said for the Court’s decision to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.121 
B. The Court Should Not Have Vacated the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
If the first “edge” of mootness is its requirement that claims improperly 
before the Court be dismissed, the second is the need to act on those dismissed 
matters by summarily vacating their rulings.122  Federal courts commonly 
vacate lower court decisions upon finding a matter moot to “clear[] the path for 
future relitigation.”123  While it is true that an absence of conflicting opinions 
can simplify relitigation, this logic should not have been applied in Alvarez.  
The Court made a correct determination, as detailed above, in finding the 
Respondents’ claims moot.124  However, as illustrated by Justice Stevens’ 
dissent, it acted improperly in vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.125 
The majority in Alvarez vacated the holding of the Seventh Circuit based 
on the proposition that lower court decisions should be vacated if a case 
becomes moot en route to the Supreme Court or while awaiting a decision on 
the merits.126  By vacating the lower opinion, the majority noted that it cleared 
the path for future relitigation of the parties’ issues while prejudicing none 
with a preliminary ruling.127  The framework the majority used to vacate the 
moot holding is well-intentioned and consistently applied, but it needs to be 
 
 118. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988) (indicating that both elements of the test 
must be present). 
 119. Regardless of whether such a claim can actually “evade review,” it is not likely to be 
“capable of repetition” and, therefore, still fails to fulfill the exception.  Cf. City of Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983). 
 120. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581. 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 122. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974). 
 123. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950).  See also id. at 39 n.2 
(listing examples).  Much like for the initial finding of mootness, exceptions to the rule of vacatur 
exist that ensure the court is not required to vacate the lower court’s opinion in every case that 
fails to present a case or controversy.  Id. 
 124. See supra Part IV.A. 
 125. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 126. Id. at 581 (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39). 
 127. Id. (citing Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40). 
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remembered that said framework can be undermined in certain exceptional 
situations. 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, highlights one such situation while 
presenting a reasonable explanation as to why the lower decision should not 
have been vacated.  In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership, the Court held that mootness determinations that were based on a 
controversy being resolved by settlement should not be vacated, as vacatur 
amounted to the government overruling a voluntary agreement between the 
involved parties.128  For Stevens, the hand-waving that the majority used to 
circumvent the obvious settlement of one of the respondents’ claims was not 
enough to disguise the fact that at least one of the claims below was completed 
via voluntary action, and the very case that the majority relied upon suggested 
that such a result should be left in place.129 
Justice Stevens’ opinion in this matter illustrates that the vacatur of the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion was wrong for two reasons.  First, Justice Stevens 
points out that the majority entertained a misguided assumption that the 
agreement between Respondent Waldo and the State’s Attorney was merely a 
“happenstance” result and not a settlement.130  While it is true that the return of 
Waldo’s property was a natural event that occurred at the end of the forfeiture 
proceedings,131 it is nevertheless also true that this end was reached as a result 
of a discretionary agreement the parties entered into, where legal rights to 
certain property were exchanged for a particular litigation result.132  Under 
Bancorp, Justice Stevens argues, the settlement should have been sufficient to 
uphold the decision of the lower court.133 
Second, Justice Stevens notes that vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
was improper because it was inappropriate to summarily dispose of a case 
where the judiciable issues were voluntarily abandoned.134  Justice Stevens 
supported this from an equitable standpoint by stating that the public (and the 
law) are “better served by leaving appellate judgments intact.”135  While the 
 
 128. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner 
Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26, 29 (1994)). 
 129. Id. 584.  Justice Stevens objects to the majority’s failure to follow precedent, noting 
“[W]e will typically decline to vacate when ‘the party seeking relief from the judgment below 
caused the mootness by voluntary action.’”  Id. at 583 (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24). 
 130. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 584. 
 131. Id.  The State returned the $1,500 seized from Waldo as part of a compromise settlement 
on March 19, 2007, fourteen months after the initial seizure.  Id. at 582 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 133. Id. at 584 (citing Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 24–26). 
 134. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  The mootness determination should 
particularly not be applied with such retroactive aplomb because the issue was still live at the 
time that the Seventh Circuit heard it. 
 135. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  “Judicial precedents are 
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole.  They are not merely the 
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majority felt that vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion would give the 
respondents the clearest possible path for relitigating the merits, it seems to 
have ignored the fact that it could have been hearing the merits itself had 
respondent Waldo not previously settled her claim.136  By vacating the 
judgment, the Court seemed to tell the respondents to come back tomorrow, 
after quickly forgetting that their problem could easily have been solved today. 
Because there was a settlement that should have prevented the Court’s 
traditional vacatur of the lower court and because the law is better served by 
leaving decisions intact, Justice Stevens seems to be correct in his notion that 
the Court erred in vacating the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.  While the Court 
may have thought it was making relitigation of similar claims simpler, it may 
have done just the opposite. 
C. Property Owners Subject to Forfeiture Face A Difficult Path for 
Relitigation 
Although Alvarez intended to clear a path for relitigation, it gave rise to 
numerous procedural consequences that require discussion to decipher.  The 
prospects for relitigation may not be clear, but they can at least be clarified to 
the point where they are understandable. 
1. The Issues in Alvarez are Still Alive 
While the respondents would be hard pressed to describe the Court’s 
actions in holding their claims moot and vacating the ruling of the Seventh 
Circuit as a victory, the outcome of Alvarez could have been much less 
positive.  Although the Court struck down the Seventh Circuit’s probable cause 
hearing requirement, it did not reverse the lower court’s reasoning on the 
merits by stating that pre-forfeiture hearings would never be required.137  In 
this sense, the Court’s claim that it was “clear[ing] the path for future 
relitigation”138 rang true, as the legal issues that characterized the merits of 
 
property of private litigants . . . .”  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. 
at 26). 
 136. Had respondent Waldo chosen not to settle but to instead pursue additional action, it is 
possible, albeit unlikely, that her claim could have been outstanding at the time this matter was 
heard.  Regardless of the timing, though, the voluntary nature of the settlement should have 
prevented vacatur. 
 137. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583.  While vacatur of a lower court’s decision is inevitably 
part of any reversal by the Supreme Court, such nullification of a holding neither applies outside 
the original jurisdiction nor carries the weight of precedent that a reversal does.  For more on the 
differences between reversals and simple vacatur, see 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review §§ 791, 
803 (2007). 
 138. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, 
Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950)). 
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Alvarez were left unresolved and remain ripe for review.139  While the issues 
remain alive, the Court’s finding of mootness may have indirectly made the 
relitigation process more complicated than originally expected. 
2. The Problem with Relitigation: Mootness and Class Actions 
Alvarez has created a circumstance where certain forfeiture claims can 
only be challenged in a particular procedural manner.140  While the procedural 
aspects of litigation are always important, the mootness and vacatur holdings 
in Alvarez demonstrate that improperly advancing a forfeiture action will doom 
a party’s claim and prevent substantive advancement of the law.141  Parties 
litigating injunctive forfeiture claims in light of Alvarez must properly evaluate 
at an early stage whether they can act as a class, as proper pleading 
conventions will make all the difference in whether claims are heard by the 
Court. 
As seen in Alvarez, individual claims for injunctive relief under DAFPA 
are unlikely to succeed.  Unless a case is fast-tracked for an unforeseeable 
reason,142 forfeiture claims under the statute are unlikely to reach the Supreme 
Court before an individual property dispute is resolved and subjected to a 
mootness determination.143  Based on this unfortunate fact, any “clear[] path 
for future relitigation”144 that would enable substantive changes in forfeiture 
law is not likely to come through an injunctive claim by individual plaintiffs. 
 
 139. Without ruling on the merits, an appellate court cannot issue an opinion fully reversing 
the legal reasoning of the lower court.  Thus, future action is permissible because the controversy 
presented in Alvarez “has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently 
congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.”  22A AM. JUR. 2D 
Declaratory Judgments § 32 (2003) (citing BKHN, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 3 Cal. App. 4th 
301, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 140. It should be noted that if the opinion of the Seventh Circuit had not been vacated, 
relitigation may not have been necessary.  The probable cause hearings established by the 
Seventh Circuit, if present, would have cured a good deal of the due process concerns associated 
with DAFPA.  While it is true that some litigants may have tried to appeal the law itself (or that 
individuals from other circuits who had not received the benefit of the hearing requirement could 
file claims), a mootness holding that had followed Bancorp and upheld the Seventh Circuit would 
have likely prevented relitigation by removing the very need for the litigation. 
 141. See Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580–81.  Respondents’ failure to litigate their case in a manner 
that presented an active controversy to the Court foreclosed the Court’s ability to issue a 
substantive ruling on the merits.  Id. 
 142. DAFPA, unlike certain federal statutes, does not have a provision for expedited review 
by the Supreme Court, and it should not be expected that actions filed under its provisions will 
make it before the Court with any unusual speed.  But see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 
417, 428–29 (1998) (discussing expedited review of the constitutionality of the line item veto via 
a provision in the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1994)). 
 143. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 144. Cf. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583. 
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Class actions, on the other hand, face much better prospects.  As 
acknowledged by Justice Scalia during the oral arguments for Alvarez, the 
formation of a class would have provided Respondents with advantages 
throughout litigation.145  The nature of the class as a legal entity would have 
allowed the Court to assume that some of the class members still had active 
injunctive claims pending that could have been justifiably heard on the 
merits.146  Since such a class was not certified, though, the respondents were 
forced to move forward as a group of individual actors—all but dooming their 
cases due to the time restraints placed on injunctive relief.147 
The necessity of class action leads to an unusual concentration of 
procedural power.  Because of the threat of mootness in forfeiture matters, the 
ability to certify or deny a class allows the district court judge to essentially 
determine whether litigation will continue.148  It could be argued that this is not 
notable because district court judges have certification power in any case and 
because decisions on class certification can be appealed.  But, because 
individual claims are so likely to be mooted due to the short window of time in 
which Illinois forfeiture actions are justiciable, the decision of a district judge 
takes on particular import.149 
As far as forfeiture claims under DAFPA are concerned, then, a district 
court’s denial of class certification effectively amounts to a sua sponte 
dismissal.  After Alvarez, individuals facing forfeiture lost the ability to seek 
probable cause hearings150 and effectively lost the ability to file individually 
due to the Court’s mootness determination and the timing provisions of 
DAFPA.151  The only realistic hope that remains for relitigating forfeiture 
claims after Alvarez, then, is through the proper certification of a class.  As a 
result of Alvarez’s convoluted procedural effects, forfeiture relief can be 
effectively obtained only through class action, and the effectiveness of that 
class will depend heavily upon the certification decision of a single judge. 
 
 145. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 82, at 38. 
 146. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (“[T]he termination of a 
class representative’s claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class.”). 
 147. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 580 (“The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ class certification 
motion. . . .  Hence the only disputes relevant here are those between these six plaintiffs and the 
State’s Attorney.”). 
 148. But see U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398 (1980) (acknowledging that 
the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” remains available where class certification is 
denied).  Such an appeal could lead to the possibility of further litigation after the district court’s 
initial determination. 
 149. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2008) (detailing that claims 
under DAFPA will largely be resolved within the187-day time limit between seizure and the final 
forfeiture proceeding). 
 150. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 583 (describing the Court’s vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Opinion). 
 151. Cf. id. at 581. 
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3. Damages, Qualified Immunity, and Pearson as a Roundabout Path to 
the Merits 
While the success of a claim for injunctive relief is determined by whether 
it is brought by an individual or through a class action, claims for damages 
present a different story.  Unlike claims for injunctive relief, claims for 
damages are evergreen in nature and not subject to dismissal for mootness.152  
Regardless of how appealing actions for damages may seem at the outset, 
though, they too face complications in providing a clear path back to the 
Supreme Court because of the protections that qualified immunity affords to 
state officials.153 
To withstand a qualified immunity defense, a litigant must demonstrate 
that there was a clearly established constitutional violation by a state actor.154  
However, since DAFPA plainly grants officers the authority to engage in the 
seizure of property associated with certain crimes, it will be difficult for 
litigants to show clear due process violations without the aid of probable cause 
hearings like those advocated by the Seventh Circuit.155  Plaintiffs can, 
therefore, still file claims for damages against the municipality or state agency 
that employed the officers,156 but the chances of such a claim ever being 
appealed to the point where it could influence policy are slim.  Government 
actors would likely choose to settle a few isolated claims over defending 
against actions that could lead to adverse rulings and thereby loss of funding 
from forfeiture activity.157 
If courts were progressively inclined, though, judges at every level could 
adopt a procedural framework that might enable plaintiffs to receive a valid 
ruling on the merits of their claims, despite the presence of a legitimate 
qualified immunity defense.  Traditionally, inquiries as to whether a damages 
 
 152. Alvarez, 130 S. Ct. at 581 (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 
8–9 (1978)). 
 153. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 154. See id. 
 155. Had the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement been upheld, it is possible that future 
litigants could claim a clearly established violation if they were denied access to such a 
proceeding.  This is mere conjecture, though, as that requirement was vacated in Alvarez. 
 156. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (noting that municipalities 
cannot use qualified immunity to claim protection from civil rights actions). 
 157. Such a scenario demonstrates how success for the respondents in such a suit would be 
different from what would be considered successful from a standpoint of constitutional 
progression.  Respondents may find a settlement for damages inflicted by their inability to use 
their vehicles to be a successful resolution to the case.  Yet, such a settlement would not be a 
success from a doctrinal standpoint, as it could not be appealed to the Supreme Court and thereby 
allow for a substantive change to forfeiture jurisprudence.  See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. 
Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994).  In this sense, the City of Chicago could indefinitely 
receive extensive funding through DAFPA forfeiture so long as it generously settled claims 
properly filed against it. 
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claim should be negated by qualified immunity were separate and distinct from 
inquiries on the merits in those same causes of action.158  Because qualified 
immunity was seen as immunity from suit and not just immunity from liability, 
courts could avoid ruling on the merits of a claim against a governmental agent 
entitled to qualified immunity, since the merits of that claim would never 
technically be at issue.159  Thus, Saucier v. Katz required courts to decide 
qualified immunity claims first, as there was no point in ruling on the merits of 
a claim if later it could be found that the parties were immune from suit.160 
As of early 2009, however, this procedural framework is no longer 
required.  In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court overruled the Saucier doctrine by 
finding that judges “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in 
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”161  
Based on this, a court hearing a damages claim could rule on the merits of the 
seizure before qualified immunity even became a question.162  While this 
holding would not rescue the respondents’ damages claim in Alvarez, it could 
allow for the merits of a damages claim against an officer engaged in DAFPA 
forfeiture to climb the appellate ladder.  If a court would be progressive 
enough to adopt this alternate framework, Pearson could provide a back door 
for relitigation.163 
By holding the respondents’ claims in Alvarez moot and vacating the 
judgment of the Seventh Circuit, the Court created a situation where the path to 
relitigation—that it touted so highly—became convoluted and heavily 
influenced by a very small number of procedural choices.  While the Court 
made the correct determination in holding the matter moot, its reversal of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision and the challenging path it has forced relitigation 
efforts to follow will make it difficult for forfeitures under DAFPA to be 
challenged in the near future unless progressive changes to existing case law 
are voluntarily exercised.  For this reason, the Court erred in failing to consider 
the merits of the respondents’ claims. 
 
 158. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
 159. Id. at 200–01. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Pearson merely gave courts the option to consider the merits first.  See id.  Courts 
remain free to follow the traditional framework.  Id. 
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V.  AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED: THE HEARING REQUIREMENT AND THE 
UNADDRESSED MERITS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION 
Until the Supreme Court takes up the interaction between due process and 
forfeiture in a case with a justiciable conflict, potential litigants will be forced 
to walk the convoluted path of forfeiture litigation without having any idea of 
what result awaits them.  When that day comes, though, how should the court 
rule?  To answer this question, the merits of Alvarez must be considered. 
A. Post-Seizure Hearings Protect the Due Process Rights of Those Subjected 
to Forfeiture 
It is clear that due process is “conferred, not by legislative grace, but by 
constitutional guarantee.”164  As such, there is no question that its 
constitutional authority will require certain procedural benchmarks for any 
seizure.165  A more pressing question, though, is whether the statutory 
forfeiture proceedings are sufficient to satisfy due process. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that determining whether due 
process required a statute to provide additional procedural protection depended 
on consideration of the parties’ private interest, the risk of wrongful 
deprivation related to the benefits of additional safeguards, and the 
government’s interest in avoiding further burdens on its seizure power.166  This 
standard is flexible and calls for protections to be provided as a particular 
situation demands—ensuring that neither the government nor the party subject 
to forfeiture will be unduly burdened. 
Mathews’s pattern of requiring further procedural action was exemplified 
in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, when it was applied to 
determine what procedures were required prior to forfeiture.167  There, the 
Court found that due process required individuals be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the government deprived them of real property, 
and only in extraordinary situations—where a government interest was at 
stake—could that hearing be postponed until after a seizure occurred.168  
Although it was argued that the ultimate forfeiture proceedings in the seizure 
statute would fulfill this goal, the Court applied Mathews and held that an 
additional hearing was required for a government actor to engage in the seizure 
of real property.169  The provision of an additional hearing prevented seizure of 
 
 164. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 165. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (“[T]he [individual’s] interest in 
avoiding . . . loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.”). 
 166. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 167. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 55. 
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property where owners would have to wait months before presenting valid 
defenses at ultimate forfeiture proceedings.170 
The application of this standard to personal property could later be seen in 
Krimstock v. Kelly.171  There, the court applied Mathews to a New York 
forfeiture statute that was challenged after several automobiles were seized 
under its provisions.172  Then-Judge Sotomayor, writing for the court, applied 
the Mathews test to balance the substantial individual interest in uninterrupted 
use of an automobile173 against the government’s interest in retaining vehicles 
that it believed it could eventually take possession of through forfeiture.174  
Under this framework, Judge Sotomayor found that since the procedures 
provided for by statute presented such a remarkably high risk of erroneous or 
excessive deprivation, and since this deprivation had the potential to so 
drastically affect the livelihood of those impacted, further procedural 
constraints on the statute were required to satisfy the concerns of due 
process.175  Using Mathews, Judge Sotomayor was able to determine that a 
prompt, post-seizure hearing needed to be provided prior to final forfeiture 
proceedings to fulfill the requirements of due process.176 
Because of Mathews’s flexibility in application and its pedigree of use in 
due process actions, it could easily have been applied to the merits in Alvarez 
and very well could have lead to a similar result as in Krimstock. 
 
 170. Id. at 56. 
 171. 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 172. Id. at 44, 60–68 (applying Mathews’s due process concerns to determine the propriety of 
N.Y.C. Code § 14-140). 
 173. Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(finding that uninterrupted use of a vehicle needs to be protected as it is something on which the 
owner’s “ability to make a living” may depend). 
 174. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 64.  The government’s interest amounted to reluctance to release 
vehicles it believed it could eventually seize, out of fear that those vehicles might never come 
back into its possession.  Id. (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 
679 (1974) (stating that when property is easily transportable, the need to retain custody to 
prevent its disappearance is heightened)). 
 175.  Id.  The Court justified the additional constraints by noting that the availability of 
forfeiture proceedings may not adequately compensate parties for losses caused by improper 
seizure. 
“Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant may not receive an 
adversary hearing until many months after the seizure.” . . .  [And even then,] an owner 
cannot recover the lost use of a vehicle by prevailing in a forfeiture proceeding.  The loss 
is felt in the owner’s inability to use a vehicle that continues to depreciate in value as it 
stands idle in the police lot. 
Id. (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993)). 
 176. Id. at 70. 
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B. Post-Seizure Hearings are Unnecessary and Redundant 
Despite its flexibility, Mathews is not the only test that could be applied by 
the Court to determine whether post-seizure hearings are required to protect 
due process in forfeiture actions under DAFPA.  A number of cases applying 
the speedy trial test of Barker v. Wingo177 have found that forfeiture statutes’ 
ultimate forfeiture proceedings provide a sufficient procedural opportunity for 
those from whom property has been seized to voice their complaints.178  If the 
Court in Alvarez were to adopt this approach, post-seizure hearings, such as 
those provided for by the Seventh Circuit, would not be required.179 
In Barker, the Court found that due process entitled a defendant to a 
speedy trial, and determining whether this standard was met necessitated 
balancing four factors: “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the 
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”180  Although 
initially limited to examination of delays in criminal trials, these factors have 
also been used to determine whether delays in civil proceedings represent 
violations of due process.181 
In United States v. Von Neumann, the Court applied Barker in finding that 
the delay between the seizure of the plaintiff’s car and the ultimate forfeiture 
proceedings did not represent a violation of due process.182  In that case, the 
plaintiff’s car was seized by customs agents and held subject to the payment of 
a bond or a forfeiture proceeding.183  Although the plaintiff paid the bond, he 
filed suit for a violation of due process.184  The Court, applying Barker, held 
that the delay between seizure and release of the vehicle did not violate due 
process, because the available forfeiture proceedings would have provided a 
sufficient forum for contesting the seizure, and because the delay between 
seizure and those proceedings did not prejudice the plaintiff’s defense.185 
Under Barker, only the most extreme delays between seizure and final 
disposition violate due process.  Essentially, so long as the government 
provides a forfeiture proceeding that enables the plaintiff to eventually 
challenge the propriety of a seizure, the speedy trial standard will be 
 
 177. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986); United States v. 
$8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1983). 
 179. This is not meant to suggest that no proceedings whatsoever would be required.  Rather, 
the Barker line of cases puts forth the opinion that the ultimate forfeiture proceeding sufficiently 
fulfills all relevant due process concerns. 
 180. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
 181. See $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 564. 
 182. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. at 250–51. 
 183. Id. at 245–46. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 250–51. 
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satisfied.186  This was the case in United States v. $8,850, where the Court 
found that an eighteen-month delay between seizure and forfeiture proceedings 
did not violate Barker.187  There, the Court recognized that the delay 
constituted a “substantial period of time,” but found it reasonable as “[t]he 
Government must be allowed some time to decide whether to institute 
forfeiture proceedings.”188 
If Barker could apply to eighteen-month delays and cars seized by customs 
officials, it is only proper to think it could apply equally well to delays of up to 
187 days and cars seized under state statute.  Based on the simplicity of 
Barker’s speedy trial result, it could very well have been applied by the Court 
in Alvarez to streamline forfeiture jurisprudence. 
C. A Proper Result and an Opportunity Missed 
Although determining which due process test to use is something of an 
outcome-determinative exercise, the Court should have used the Mathews test 
to determine whether the respondents in Alvarez were entitled to post-seizure 
hearings, because of Mathews’s inherent flexibility and the present similarities 
with cases that have adopted its provisions.189 
If Mathews’s balancing test were to be applied to Alvarez, the Court’s 
ruling would likely track those of similar claims applying the same standard 
(particularly given the addition of Justice Sotomayor to the Bench).190  
Because Krimstock and James Daniel Good Real Property dealt with factual 
scenarios similar to those in Alvarez, the post-seizure hearing advocated by the 
Seventh Circuit would likely have been upheld under a Mathews analysis.  
Through such a holding, the Court would show that due process in forfeiture 
actions is concerned less with the timing of hearings and more with parties’ 
ability to plead while their words still have an effect.191 
Further, upholding the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement would have 
allowed the Court to take a major step towards reducing government abuse of 
forfeiture as a fundraising mechanism.  As Professors Miller and Selva pointed 
 
 186. Id. at 250. 
 187. United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 569–70 (1983). 
 188. Id. at 565, 569. 
 189. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 190. Justice Sotomayor, who wrote the opinion in Krimstock, was elevated to the Supreme 
Court by President Obama shortly before oral argument was heard in Alvarez.  Cf. Charlie 
Savage, Sotomayor Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/us/politics/09sotomayor.html. 
 191. Cf. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. at 556 (holding that an eighteen-month gap 
between seizure and forfeiture proceedings still allows an appropriate forum for review and the 
presentation of possible defenses).  Although such a claim was justified under Barker from a 
timing standpoint, it is clear under Mathews that such a delay would not allow for the plaintiffs to 
obtain hearings on their claims that could be seen as upholding due process. 
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out, police departments, municipalities, and government agencies receive great 
returns from engaging in forfeiture activity.192  In 2008 alone, the Chicago 
Police Department—which performed the seizures that were the subject of 
Alvarez—took in nearly $13.5 million in forfeiture assets.193  These returns 
provide officers with the incentive to violate rights in order to seize valuable 
property.194  By requiring post-seizure hearings, the Court would have forced 
officers to justify their seizures long before those subjected to forfeiture lose 
hope of reclaiming their property and agree to give up their rights to forfeiture 
proceedings in exchange for nominal settlements.195  By regulating the self-
interested nature of police action in this manner, the Court would use Mathews 
to strengthen due process without preventing agencies from collecting on 
properly seized assets—a regulation to which only dishonest organizations 
would likely object. 
The Barker test could be applied to these circumstances, but it would allow 
them to properly affect ideas of due process.  Granted, it would be convenient 
to apply the speedy trial standard to cases such as Alvarez, but it must never be 
forgotten that, although forfeiture actions run parallel to criminal ones, the 
forfeiture track contains parties with markedly different goals.196  Applying 
Barker allows the Court to see if an unreasonable delay has occurred, but 
prevents it from ignoring such delays if proceedings are already in place. 
Additionally, while applying Barker allowed the Court in $8,850 in U.S. 
Currency to declare delays up to eighteen months could be reasonable, the 
customs seizures of cash in that case cannot be compared to the vehicle seizure 
here.197  As the Seventh Circuit stated in Smith, “Our society is, for good or 
not, highly dependent on the automobile.  The hardship posed by the loss of 
one’s means of transportation . . . is hard to calculate.”198  A delay this 
excessive, whether 187 days or 18 months, would violate due process by 
preventing parties from seeking relief, and Barker could not be applied in good 
conscience if it would permit such a ruling.199 
To ensure the provision of due process and to reduce the number of 
seizures improperly motivated by officers’ or municipalities’ desire for 
monetary gain, the respondents in Alvarez should have been given an 
 
 192. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317–18. 
 193. Editorial, Police for Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24–25, 2009, at A14. 
 194. See Miller & Selva, supra note 26, at 317–18. 
 195. Cf. Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 582 (2009) (detailing Respondent Waldo’s 
settlement).  It is possible that had Waldo received a post-seizure probable cause hearing, she 
would have realized her claim had merit and refused to settle. 
 196. See supra Part I.A–C. 
 197. See United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983). 
 198. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 199. See Ilya Somin, Forfeiture Laws, the War of Drugs, and Alvarez v. Smith, FINDLAW 
.COM (Oct. 14, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20091014_somin.html. 
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opportunity for a hearing before a neutral party.  Had the Court been able to 
issue a ruling on the merits in Alvarez, it would have done well by applying 
Mathews and upholding the Seventh Circuit’s post-seizure hearing 
requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court properly held Alvarez v. Smith moot because the case 
presented no active case or controversy, but by vacating the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision, the Court did less to ease relitigation than it did to complicate the 
path of future forfeiture claims.  As a result of the hurried timeframes of 
DAFPA forfeiture actions, the effect of qualified immunity on damages claims, 
and the Court’s vacatur of the Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement, Alvarez 
complicated the process of challenging government forfeitures. 
After wading through this quagmire, it becomes difficult to fathom that 
despite these complications, Alvarez had little effect on the substantive law of 
forfeiture.  Granted, it is possible, based on the application of the Mathews 
standard and the recent elevation of Justice Sotomayor to the Court, that the 
Seventh Circuit’s hearing requirement could have been upheld had the court 
reached the merits of the case.  But without an opinion, this will never be 
certain.  In Alvarez, the Court seems to have taken pride in further convoluting 
one of the already complicated paths to its door.  Luckily, as long as police 
departments can wield the double-edged sword that is forfeiture, another civil 
action will inevitably allow for a ruling on the propriety of its use. 
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